After a month of training in the South China Sea, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning returned to its homeport of Qingdao last week. The South China Morning Post reported that the ship was joined by at least five escort vessels, while the recent drills were meant to highlight the fact that it remained combat-ready as its crew was unaffected by the coronavirus pandemic.
It was the longest training session conducted by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) since it resumed all-large scale military drills in March, following the suspension of drills due to efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19.
The training was part of a routine arrangement in the annual plan, which features long durations at sea. During this time, the People’s Liberation Army website ChinaMilitary reported that the aircraft carrier’s integrated combat capability underwent testing.
“The drills have further improved the real combat training level of the Liaoning carrier strike group, putting its systematic combat capability to the test,” the PLAN posted on social media.
Discussion of Chinese intentions inevitably draws attention to the pronounced buildup of naval weaponry in recent years, with each year bringing fresh confirmation of China’s ability to leapfrog existing assessments of the size of its navy. Thus, in April 2020, China constructed a second Type 075 warship, a class designed to compete in amphibious capability with the American Wasp class ships. Two more are anticipated, as are two more aircraft carriers. These are clearly designed to match American warships, and raise interest in China’s ability to sustain distant interest by sea, most obviously in the Indian Ocean, but also wherever Chinese geopolitical concerns may be favored by naval power projection. Areas where China has maritime interests include not only the South-West Pacific, where it has been actively developing alliance partnerships, much to the disquiet of Australia, but also the Caribbean. Moreover, Chinese maritime partners include Equatorial Guinea. So, the notion that China might automatically “limit” itself to dominating a “near China,” of the East and South China Seas is implausible. Even were that to be the goal, the need to prevent external intervention in that dominance, intervention most obviously by the American and Japanese navies, but also by that of Australia, would require a greater range of naval activity in terms of “access denial.” It was that principle that led the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the modern counterparts would be seeking to thwart the use of Guam and to block chokepoints of naval access.
Along overdue reassessment of how the United States should deal with the People’s Republic of China is finally taking place, with governments across the West jarred into action by the devastation wrought by the pandemic and by the Chinese government’s prevarication and lack of transparency since the crisis began. Despite a concerted and aggressive propaganda campaign by the Chinese Communist Party through various channels in the West to deflect blame for the cover-up and mishandling of the initial stages of the Wuhan epidemic, in country after affected country, momentum is building to fundamentally reorder relations with China. As the pandemic cuts ever-deeper into our social fabric, devastating our economies and increasing the likelihood we will be set back a generation when it comes to growth and prosperity—with a deep recession or even depression a real possibility—the systemic vulnerability brought about by offshoring the production of critical medicines and supplies to an adversary state is plain for all to see. As national debts track for levels unseen since 1945, pre-pandemic assumptions about overall global and regional power balances, their long-term trends and the durability of legacy security institutions have been called into question.
The South China Sea is becoming even choppier. Last month, China started to conduct a seismic survey within Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and a Vietnamese fishing boat sank near the Paracel Islands after a collision with a China Coast Guard vessel.
Beijing is making gradual progress toward achieving its objective of gaining international assent to China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. With each decade, more of Beijing’s agenda is realized. During the 1970s, China limited its attempted enforcement of Chinese claims mostly to the Paracels Islands, which lies in the northern part of the South China Sea, closer to China. Beijing’s violent seizure of Johnson South Reef from Vietnam in 1988 was jarring but unusual. More typical of the era was the “creeping invasion” of the 1990s, exemplified by the rickety makeshift structures built on Mischief Reef in the more southerly Spratly Group. In 1999 Beijing began attempting to impose bans on fishing in the South China Sea during the summer months, making the case that China has administrative control.
Recent developments in the South China Sea might lead one to assume that Beijing is taking advantage of the coronavirus crisis to further its ambitions in the disputed waterway. But it’s important to note that China has been following a long-term game plan in the sea for decades. While it’s possible that certain moves were made slightly earlier than planned because of the pandemic, they likely would have been made in any case, sooner or later.
Anding Nadie Repil was thrown overboard after his boat collided tossing him into the ocean. He survived by clinging on to a plastic can and eating seaweed, reports say.
Mr. Jonathan Moore expressed his thanks to Vietnam for production cooperation and presentation of medical protection products to the US. Considering Vietnam a model in COVID-19 prevention and control, he said that the two countries can share experiences on fighting the pandemic and on economic recovery, one of current priorities of the US Government.
In an interview with VOV, Kraska said China’s announcement about “Xisha” and “Nansha” is a way to flex its muscles on the “Four Sha” plan that China introduced in 2017, which is really just a variation of the “9-dash line” rejected by the the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016.
![[Video] Maritime Security in the South China Sea with John McCain](https://southchinasea.com/images/resized/images/2012/john mccain 20_50_30.jpg "[Video] Maritime Security in the South China Sea with John McCain")
